Average and expected job tenure of workers has fallen significantly over the last two decades. Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage. Traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common, while defined contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread. The link between job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it offers insights about both phenomena. This paper uses a contract-theoretic matching model with moral hazard to explain changes in both pension structure and job tenure; we discuss how a richer model with job-specific human capital subject to technology shocks would yield similar results. In our model, a decline in the value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces expected match duration and thus the appeal of DB pensions. We argue that these trends are linked to changes in the nature of new technologies. This explanation is consistent with observed trends in technological change, tenure, and pension structure. Our results suggest an additional consequence of technological progress that has not been closely studied.
Introduction
In the middle of the economic boom of the 1990s, the New York Times suggested that "the notion of lifetime employment has come to seem as dated as soda jerks, or tail fins" (Kolbert and Clymer 1996) . 1 Most data sets
show that job tenure, especially of male workers, has fallen over the last two decades. Average tenure of male full-time employees in the Survey of Consumer Finances fell almost 10%, from 9.7 to 8.8 years, and expected remaining job tenure dropped more. Average tenure of female full-time employees rose and then fell, suggesting that their rising attachment to the labor force was tempered by an overall decline in tenure.
Workers have also experienced a major shift in pension coverage since the early 1980s. Traditional defined benefit pensions, designed to reward long tenure, have become steadily less common, while defined contribution pensions, which are largely portable, have spread. The link between job tenure and pension trends has not been closely examined, but it offers insights about both phenomena.
Analyzing this link allows us to bridge some key gaps in the literatures on job stability and on the structure of compensation. First, we develop a matching model with endogenous job destruction that can explain the use of deferred compensation contracts and their connection to job duration. Earlier models of pensions typically did not incorporate uncertainty, nor make explicit the nature of the worker's outside option -both of which crucially affect the value of deferred compensation contracts. Earlier models of job matching rarely incorporated the use of deferred compensation. A group of recent search papers has begun to analyze tenure-based contracts designed to deter on-the-job search; 2 this paper uses a model with a simpler form of moral hazard to highlight how changes in the economic environment alter the feasibility of such contracts.
Second, we discuss what kinds of shifts in the stochastic productivity process can explain the observed trends in job tenure and pension structure. The model does not require a change in the productivity of new matches.
Instead, we focus on two less drastic possibilities: (i) an increased frequency of shocks that reduce the value of existing matches relative to new matches or (ii) an increase in uncertainty. Thus, the model provides possible explanations for the observed decline in job tenure, which few researchers have analyzed. It also offers a new, endogenous explanation for the decline in DB pensions that differs from the focus of other researchers on exogenous changes in pension regulation.
Third, we argue that new technologies have reduced the value of existing jobs relative to new jobs and, perhaps, raised uncertainty. We also demonstrate that observed trends in technological change, tenure, and pension structure support the empirical implications of the model. Many other studies have shown that new technologies like computers require new skills, replace tasks done previously by unskilled workers, increase the complexity required in many remaining tasks, and induce a reorganization of work within a firm. 1 We have appropriated this quote, with thanks, from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999). 2 Burdett and Coles (2003) , Stevens (forthcoming) , and Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss pensions and pension regulation. We argue that regulatory changes do not fully explain the shift in pension structure. In Section 3, we review past research on the function of DB pensions. In a series of papers, Lazear argued that DB pensions are designed to encourage longer tenure in the face of imperfect monitoring of worker effort. We discuss other reasons why longer tenure may be valuable, such as motivating match-specific investment.
In Section 4, we develop a matching model and incorporate Lazear's notions of DB pensions. We show that a contract that defers compensation conditional on tenure, mimicking a DB pension, elicits optimal effort. 3 However, the contract may break down in the face of shocks to the output process which make it riskier to get bound into a long-term relationship. In Section 5, instead of generating an endogenous shift in pension structure,
we use our model to analyze the efficiency consequences if government restricts the use of pensions.
In Section 6, we discuss the empirical predictions generated by the model. A lack of data makes it difficult to estimate our model directly. Instead, we show that trends in pension structure, job tenure, and technological change are consistent with our explanation for the evolution of pension structure and job tenure. We find that job tenure is related to pension structure, that the value of long-term jobs appears to have dropped, and that greater declines in job tenure occurred in industries with higher rates of technological progress.
In Section 7, we conclude by linking our results to other research on the nature of new technologies. Many of the phenomena identified in earlier studies support our explanation about why the value of long-term jobs has declined. Our results suggest a further consequence of technological progress that has not been closely studied.
Background
In this section, we set the stage by discussing trends in job tenure and pension structure. We also discuss the structure of typical DB and DC pensions. Lastly, we contend that, while pension regulation has changed a great deal, it does not fully explain the observed trends in pension structure.
Trends in job tenure and pension structure
We find that both current and expected remaining job tenure fell in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), so total expected job duration fell by roughly 6-16%, depending on the time period and sample. Over the same period, DB pension coverage declined a great deal. Our theoretical and empirical analyses later on will show the links between these trends. The SCF data that we use began in 1983 and surveyed a new cross-section of roughly 5,000 individuals every three years, offering the longest consistent information on pension coverage. 4 Other data sets do not report expected tenure nor include information on both tenure and pension structure. 5 
Trends in job tenure
Current job tenure. Average job tenure of male full-time employees in the SCF fell from 9.7 in 1983 to 8.8 years in 1998. Average tenure of female full-time employees rose from 7.4 years in 1983 to 8.1 years in 1992 and then fell back to 7.3 in 1998. Table 1 about here Table 1 Changes in job tenure among women apparently reflect a combination of cohort-specific increases in labor force attachment and secular declines in job tenure. For example, tenure rose and then fell a little for those 16 or more years of potential experience, while it tended to remain steady early on and then fell more for those with less potential experience.
Expected remaining job tenure. The SCF also asked respondents how long they expected to continue working for their current employer -providing a direct measure of expected job duration, which is a key element of the model we present later. Expected tenure data are noisier than actual tenure data but show a clear decline as well, so the decline shown in Table 1 reflects more than a one-time reshuffling of workers into new job with unchanged levels of expected tenure.
Among full-time employees aged 21-59, expected remaining tenure for men fell from 18.6 in 1983 and 16.2 in 1989 to 14.7 in 1998 and for women fell from 15.9 in 1983 to 12.5 in 1989, rose to 14.4 in 1992, and then fell to 12.8 in 1998. 6 Table 2 shows expected remaining job tenure by gender and years of current tenure. Among men, 4 We omit data from the 1986 SCF, which asked fewer questions about pensions and only surveyed respondents from the 1983 SCF. 5 The primary disadvantage of the SCF is that industry and occupation are reported at a very aggregated level (only 6-7 classification codes reported). The CPS has pension supplements, but the last one was in 1993, and the wording of questions changed over time. The Survey of Income and Program Participation has job tenure and mobility data but weak information about pensions. The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth offers job histories but for a limited age range. The Health and Retirement Study offers job histories and very detailed information about pensions, but for a limited age range and only beginning in 1992. The pension data on Form 5500, reported to the government by employers, lacks information on worker and job characteristics. 6 The wording and organization of survey questions regarding future work plans was different enough that the 1983 SCF may not be comparable to later years. Therefore, we discuss how expected tenure changed both since 1983 and since 1989. We restrict the expected tenure fell most for those with shorter current tenure -confirming that the expected duration of new matches has declined. For example, for those with 0-5 years of current tenure, expected remaining tenure fell from 19.6 years in 1983 and 16.7 in 1989 to 14.5 in 1998 . It fell by less for men with current tenure of 6-15 and 16-25 years and changed little for men with more than 25 years of tenure. In results that are not shown, we can see that expected tenure of more-educated men fell uniformly, while trends among less-educated men were more erratic. Table 2 about here Again, changes in expected remaining job tenure among women reflect a combination of rising labor supply together with declining job tenure. As with men, expected tenure for more educated women fell relative to less educated women.
Total expected job tenure. Adding together current tenure with expected remaining tenure yields an estimate of total expected job duration. For men, total expected tenure fell from 27.3 years in 1983 to 24.6 years in 1989 and 23.0 years in 1998, a 15.5% decline between 1983 and 1998 and a 6.3% decline between 1989 and 1998. For women, the total went from 22.8 years in 1983 and 22.1 years in 1992 to 19.9 years in 1998. Thus, expected tenure fell by 12.9% between 1983 and 1998 and by 10.3% between its peak in 1992 and 1998.
Other research on trends in job tenure. Early researchers, spurred by anecdotal reports of a decline in longterm jobs, argued that job tenure appeared to be stable Polsky 1996, 1997; Farber 1996) . Since then, researchers have found mounting evidence of a decline in male job stability in the Current Population Survey (Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen 1999; BLS 2000) , the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Jaeger and Stevens 1999) , and the National Longitudinal Surveys of young cohorts (Bernhardt, et. al., 1999) , although not the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) (Gottschalk and Moffitt 1999; Bansak and Raphael 1998). Farber (1997) noted that the decline in tenure in the CPS was not matched by an increase in layoffs, indicating that the increases in mobility have been to some extent voluntary. None of these earlier papers used the SCF to investigate changes in job stability. Figure 1 shows that DB pensions have become much less common and DC pensions have become more common.
Trends in pension structure
Among full-time employees with a pension, 69% had a defined benefit (DB) plan and 45% had a defined contribution (DC) plan in 1983, while 40% had a DB plan and 80% had a DC plan in 1998. Overall pension coverage declined somewhat at the same time, from 67% of full-time employees in 1983 to 58% in 1998. Later, we show age range of this sample to 21-59 in order to avoid any confounding trends in educational attainment or retirement.
that remaining DB pensions seem to have declined in value as well.
Figure 1 about here
A more detailed analysis of pension trends suggests a relationship to underlying structural changes in the economy. Pension coverage did not shift uniformly in all types of jobs, but rather that at varying rates by industry, occupation, and education level -in other words, by type of job and type of worker. We used analysisof-variance to decompose pension trends by type of job and worker. 7 Year main effects explain just under half (48%) of the over-time variation in DB pension coverage -so half of the decline occurred uniformly across types of jobs. Year-industry interactions explain 22%, indicating different changes in DB pension coverage across different industries; year-occupation interactions explain 13%, and year-education interactions explain 15%. 8 
The structure of pensions
Defined benefit pensions. DB pensions offer a defined payout to workers after they leave an employer. Pension wealth can reach quite high levels by the end of one's career. Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988) estimated that the pension loss associated with switching jobs for the average worker aged 35-54 is approximately half a year's earnings. Among older workers with a pension in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 1992, median pension wealth was around $200,000, assuming that workers eventually leave their job at age 65.
We can summarize the flow in terms of pension wealth P t , defined as the actuarially discounted real present value of the worker's expected future pension benefits, if the job ends at year t. Pension wealth accrual is the discounted change in pension wealth 1 1+r P t+1 − P t , if the employee works one additional year and then leaves. The path of DB pension wealth accrual is typically characterized by sharp spikes. While the specific parameters of DB plans vary a great deal across employers, Figure 2 shows pension wealth accrual in a particular DB plan from the 1992 HRS. 9 Spikes are generated at the vesting date and at the early and/or normal retirement dates, depending on the vagaries of particular pension formulas. Typically, the pension benefit slows or stops rising with additional earnings later on, so that pension accruals turn negative since the worker foregoes income by not retiring. 7 In addition to the year effects and interactions discussed here, the independent variables included age and age squared; employer size; main effects for education, occupation, industry, and union coverage; interactions of education and occupation and of industry and occupation; gender and interactions of gender with education, occupation, and industry. Statistics were weighted using survey weights. 8 Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) offered detailed information about pension trends within industries and occupations. Although researchers found different results using Form 5500 data, little of the aggregate trend in the SCF can be explained by the movement of workers across broad industries and occupations; within-occupation and within-industry changes in pension structure dominate. 9 The HRS sample was aged 51-61 in 1992. The HRS obtained detailed information about pension plans from employers of survey respondents; the median value of pension wealth was computed for those plans for which employers reported information. The pension plans shown in Figure 2 have been slightly altered, as described in Friedberg and Webb (2000, 2003) , to protect confidentiality. To sum up, DB plans typically discourage worker mobility for many years after a worker starts a job and later encourage retirement when pension accruals turn negative. Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) pointed out, nevertheless, that pension wealth may be quite small at the start of a job. Therefore, while the reward to staying in the job and accruing DB pension wealth is high at that point, so might be the gain to changing jobs, if it entails a pay raise worth a few percentage points and the same type of compensation path afterwards. They argued, therefore, that the primary effect of DB pensions is to deter mobility of longer-tenure workers, rather than new workers. When we present our model later, we will discuss extensions involving investment in match-specific capital which capture the distinction between mobility incentives of shorter and longer-tenure workers.
Defined contribution pensions. Employer contributions and mandatory employee contributions to DC plans are a form of deferred compensation, since employees are typically forbidden from withdrawing or borrowing against their plan balances. 10 The accrual of DC pension wealth is simple: contributions go into an account which earns a return, and the account is portable after vesting. Most DC pensions have vesting periods that are either immediate or less than two years (Mitchell 1999 ). Thus, DC pensions are tenure-neutral after vesting.
The smooth path of DC pension wealth accrual shown in Figure 2 stands in stark contrast to the path of DB accrual. Friedberg and Owyang (2002a) discuss the differences between DB and DC plans in more detail. 11 
Regulation of pension plans
Summary of regulatory changes. Employer-provided pension plans were largely unregulated until the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. Since then, the government has frequently altered and tightened pension regulations. These changes have focused on three aspects of pension provision:
• Funding of DB pensions. ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures DB pensions. ERISA and subsequent laws also set increasingly strict limits on both under-and over-funding of DB pensions.
• Tax incentives for DC pensions. Post-ERISA legislation established tax deductions for new varieties of DC pensions, particularly those involving voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans. 10 Voluntary contributions by employees do not strictly constitute deferred compensation but confer tax benefits that are not available for all forms of saving. The tax treatment of DB and DC plans is similar -contributions are tax-deductible, returns accumulate tax-free, and both DB pension benefits and DC pension withdrawals are taxable income. 11 A recent development in the shift in pension structure is the appearance of cash balance plans, which are hybrid pensions that accrue pension wealth like DC plans but are technically DB plans in terms of funding standards. There is little concern about misclassifying cash balance plans in our data analysis, however because they were still uncommon at the end of our SCF sample period in 1998.
• Constraints on the structure of both types of pensions. One goal of new regulatory constraints has been to limit the extent to which pensions favor high-earning employees. Another goal has been to reduce losses in pension wealth experienced by workers who leave a job early. For example, ERISA established a maximum vesting period of 10-15 years, shortened to 5-7 years by subsequent legislation. A third goal has been to ensure that workers who stay in a job a long time continue to accrue pension benefits. Thus, a 1986 law prohibited age-based cutoffs on the accumulation of DB pension benefits.
Impact on pension structure. While enhanced tax incentives can explain why DC pensions have spread, it cannot explain why DB pensions have become less common, since a worker can have both types of plans.
Researchers have suggested at least three other ways in which regulatory changes may have caused the shift away from DB pensions. However, we argue that none of these fully explain observed trends in pension structure.
First, as pensions have been increasingly regulated, the costs of administering both DB and DC plans have risen. Ippolito (1995) reported estimates from the Hay-Huggins Company (1990) indicating that only very small DB plans grew relatively more expensive compared to very small 401(k) plans, while average administrative costs of medium-sized and large plans rose at similar rates. Using longitudinal data on pension plans, Kruse (1995) concluded that rising administrative costs might explain some but not all of the decline in DB pensions during 1980-86.
Second, Clark and McDermed (1990) claimed that many of the regulatory changes limited the extent to which DB plans could be designed as incentive contracts of the type we model later. For example, before ERISA many DB pensions only vested at the normal retirement date (Ippolito 1988 ). However, DB pension wealth can still accrue highly nonlinearly. The DB plan in Figure 2 delivers a much greater fraction after twenty years of tenure than when it vests, and it begins to lose value after the early retirement date in spite of a prohibition on age-related cutoffs.
Third, Ippolito (2001 Ippolito ( , 2003 argued that regulatory changes involving reversion taxes allowed companies to escape their DB pension obligations more easily than before. Once some companies took advantage of this, he claimed, it undermined the confidence of other workers in the implicit pension contract. However, a fourth effect related to confidence may be important as well. In the model developed in this paper, we disregard the possibility that an employer could renege on the DB pension -for example, by underfunding pensions and then declaring bankruptcy. If reneging is a concern, however, then new funding standards and pension insurance will increase the willingness of workers to accept DB pensions.
Past research on the shift in pension structure
Past research suggests that the evolution of pension structure has been associated with structural shifts in the economy. That is a major reason why we argue that regulatory changes fail to completely explain pension trends.
A series of papers showed that workers have shifted from jobs that typically offer DB plans to jobs that typically offer DC plans. A series of recent papers used Form 5500 data reported by employers to the government to investigate changes in pension structure. 12 While each of the papers showed that DB pensions remain more prevalent in large firms, industries such as manufacturing, and unionized jobs, several also suggested that the proportion of workers in such jobs declined. According to Gustman and Steinmeier and Ippolito, for example, the movement of workers across jobs might explain half of the shift in aggregate pension structure.
Other papers have shown that inequality in pension coverage has grown along with earnings inequality. Using data on individuals from the Current Population Survey, Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even and Macpherson (2000) showed that inequality in pension coverage by skill group has increased, mirroring trends in earnings inequality -a further indicator of structural change related to use of DB pensions.
Theories of DB Pensions
Past theoretical research has sought to explain the incentive effects of DB pensions. We build on the idea that DB plans are designed to encourage optimal effort and longer tenure.
DB pensions as incentive contracts. In a series of papers summarized in Lazear (1986), Lazear developed models in which employers structure compensation to deter shirking by workers whose effort cannot be observed perfectly. A DB pension, whose value rises with job tenure, motivates effort by workers who do not want to get fired and lose their "bond". 13 Sunk costs provide another motive for the use of DB pensions. For example, if hiring or firing entails fixed costs, then employers will only hire if expected job duration is long enough. The same factor affect employers' decisions to train workers and workers' decisions to invest in job-specific training. A different motive for tenurebased contracts, though with some similar implications, is offered in Burdett and Coles (2003) , Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2003) , and Stevens (forthcoming); employers defer compensation in order to discourage on-the-job search by workers who seek better outside offers. Lazear (1983) argued that DB pensions also function as severance pay to encourage efficient retirement when workers age. The pension may work in concert with a rising wage profile, another element of an incentive 12 Clark and McDermed (1990) , Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) , Kruse (1995) , Ippolito (1995) , and Papke (1999) . The primary disadvantage of Form 5500 data is the lack of information about characteristics of covered workers. 13 Related ideas also appeared in Becker and Stigler (1974) .
contract. 14 We chose not to incorporate a rising wage profile in our model, since empirical tests of theories of rising wages have not yielded clear conclusions. 15 We could extend our model to generate a rising wage profile if we imposed restrictions on the extent to which compensation could be deferred through the DB pension. We also chose not to include an explicit retirement motive, since our model generates an endogenous termination date without it. In any case, there is little evidence that changes in retirement motives generated the shift in pension structure, since pensions of older workers have changed much less than pensions of younger and shorter-tenure workers (Friedberg and Webb 2003) . Also, if anything, the move away from DB plans may have increased firms' use of temporary early retirement inducements (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1990; Brown 2000).
Other possible motives for DB pensions. An alternative theory is that DB pensions attract more productive workers, rather than eliciting higher productivity after workers are hired (Viscusi 1985 , Ippolito 1994 ). Empirical tests of screening and self-selection motives for DB pensions have been attempted but run into difficulties in resolving identification problems (Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993, Even and Macpherson 1990). We describe these models in more detail in Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) . Another important point is that an endogenous explanation for the shift in pension structure in this class of models involves a decline in the value of screening.
This seems implausible given other labor market trends such as the growth in earnings inequality among workers with similar skills. This has been widely interpreted as an increased return to unobserved ability, which suggests an increased need to screen workers and thus a greater value of deferring compensation. Because theories related to screening lead to some counterintuitive predictions and fail to offer a ready explanation for the shift in pension coverage, we do not incorporate a screening motive for pensions.
The observed link between unionization and pension coverage has led some researchers to focus on theories related to union bargaining. 16 Empirical evidence on the link between unionization and pension coverage trends is ambiguous, though. While both DB pensions and unionized jobs have disappeared over time, the evidence presented above and cited in earlier research suggests that the shift out of unionized jobs does not explain a great deal of the change in pension structure. Moreover, an implication of the model we develop later is that a decline in a worker's bargaining power has an ambiguous effect. It will make shirking more attractive and thus increase the value of the pension contract, though at the extreme it destroys the pension contract entirely because the contract can no longer deter shirking at all.
A Model of Pensions
We develop an incomplete-contracting job-matching model that incorporates insights from past research on DB pensions. Matching models offer a rich representation of the labor market and the effects of uncertainty which is absent from earlier models of pensions. 17 However, search and matching models have tended to focus on the rate and duration of unemployment and feature exogenous job destruction, while ours emphasizes the duration of employment and features endogenous job destruction, which motivates the use of pensions.
In order to develop our arguments, we present a baseline Nash bargaining model (Model N) and then a Nash bargaining model with moral hazard (Model MH), which build on den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000, hereafter DRW). 18 As in DRW, moral hazard induces endogenous match destruction. We propose a pension-contract model (Model P) that discourages moral hazard and eliminates inefficient match destruction, although we do not demonstrate that it is the only contract that would do so. After presenting the pension model, we discuss changes in the productivity process that would lead agents to abandon the pension contract, and we offer a brief survey of theories of DC pensions.
The baseline model with Nash bargaining
The matching market. As in DRW, a continuum of atomistic unemployed workers and firms who are searching in the labor market in a given period meet each other with probability λ. 19 The matched worker and firm i get an output draw Y i,t and decide whether to produce. If they do not produce, they return to the matching market next period. They decide to produce if the output draw exceeds a threshold value R, reflecting the surplus from producing today and from the option to get another output draw and produce in future periods.
Output. Output Y is drawn from a distribution F (y) which is the same for all new matches. Thus, while matches are heterogeneous in their actual production draws, agents are identical ex ante. Later we will assume that output is drawn from a standard uniform distribution in order to illustrate the important characteristics of the model.
Production under Nash bargaining. In each period, the agents decide whether to continue producing or whether to rejoin the labor market and draw their outside options. They do this by comparing the match output with the outside options if they break up the match. If they produce, the agents split the match surplus, with a share θ going to the worker and 1 − θ going to the firm. 17 Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) offered a survey of matching models. 18 Valletta (1999) discussed how extensions to a similar model by Ramey and Watson (1997) could help explain the decline in job tenure, but he did not write down such a model or focus on pensions, as we do. Ramey and Watson (1997) modeled bilateral shirking in a pure contract-theoretic framework without search. Our approach extends the severance contract which they outlined to the search and matching model employed in DRW. 19 Friedberg, Owyang, and Sinclair (2003) allows workers to search while on the job.
If the match breaks up, the worker and firm receive b w and b f from their contemporaneous outside option and expect φ w and φ f from re-entering the matching pool. If they continue to produce, the current value of the match is Y + g (R), where g is the continuation value of staying in the match and depends on a threshold output level R satisfying
where We can define the joint continuation value of the match as
The continuation value equals the discounted value of the match next period if output exceeds the threshold value R, plus the discounted value of the outside option if output does not exceed R. Joint surplus from the match is defined as the value of the match less the value of re-entering the matching pool, Y + g(R) − φ, and gets split between the agents according to the worker's relative bargaining share θ.
The value to the worker and firm of re-entering the matching pool is given by
These values depend on the probability of re-matching λ and subsequently drawing a satisfactory level of output (exceeding the threshold R) or alternatively remaining in the matching pool until the subsequent period. For ease of discussion, we define J(R) = R ∞ R ydF (y). J(R) reflects the value of output conditional on the match persisting (y > R), which decreases as R increases.
Solution. We assume that the distribution F (y) is standard uniform. 20 The model can then be summarized by the following equations: 20 For a nonstationary generic distribution of Y, the model can be expressed in terms of J(R) and of the probability Pr[Y t < R N ] of match dissolution. The assumption F t+1 (y) > F t (y) yields the upward drift case of DRW, in which no jobs are destroyed in steady state. F t+1 (y) < Ft(y) yields the downward drift case of Hammour (1994, 1996) , in which jobs are inevitably destroyed.
The solution to (4), denoted by the subscript N , is obtained from:
. 21 A higher value of the output threshold R N raises the continuation value g N but also raises the value φ N of re-entering the matching pool. R N itself is a positive concave function of the contemporaneous outside option b. Additionally, for high values of b, R N increases in the discount rate β and decreases in the probability of rematching λ.
The wage paid to the worker each period will be the worker's portion of the surplus plus his outside option less his portion of the match continuation value. Under Nash bargaining, this is equivalent to the worker's share of output:
To facilitate discussion, we offer the following definition:
and Jointly Unproductive if
21 R solves the fixed point of the first equation of (5) and then determines g and φ. Note that R is negative for some values of b, implying no exogenous breakups.
In the Nash model, all matches are Jointly Productive. 22 
The Moral Hazard model
The following model illustrates the inefficiency that results when unobservable effort on the part of the worker affects future match productivity. While we specify a simple form of moral hazard -low effort today destroys the continuation value of the match -we will indicate how it stands in for richer models, in which a worker decides whether to invest in match-specific capital that keeps the output distribution from drifting down, while skill-specific technological changes erodes the stock of capital.
Moral hazard. Consider now the earlier model, augmented with moral hazard which pays off x to the agents; for simplicity, we will limit consideration to moral hazard by the worker. A worker who shirks gains x w this period but reduces future match productivity and thus the continuation value g(R). We assume that shirking causes g(R) to go to zero, so the match is severed. 23 Production in the presence of moral hazard. With the addition of moral hazard, the model is almost the same as in (4), except the expression for R changes to:
If the moral hazard premium x exceeds the outside benefit b, then reservation productivity rises by the difference.
Definition 2 As above, a match with moral hazard is Jointly Productive if
The match is Incentive Compatible if both of the following are satisfied:
The first inequality states that the firm's payoff (current period profit Y − w plus continuation value g f ) must exceed its total outside option. The second inequality states that the worker's payoff (wage w plus continuation 22 If match productivity drifts downward, matches will inevitably become Jointly Unproductive as more of the probability mass drifts below the reservation productivity. If R is time-dependent, it changes the steady-state separation characteristics; see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for details. 23 Suppose that match productivity is a function of match-specific human capital which must be kept current at a cost x w to the worker. When the worker fails to update her specific human capital, match productivity falls enough to induce the firm to sever the match.
value g w ) must exceed the value of shirking plus the worker's outside option. Productive. Essentially, x w > b creates a wedge between efficient and sustainable matches that require extra productivity in order to overcome shirking. These scenarios are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that no steady-state displacements occur in the model without moral hazard (i.e., that (7) above holds). For any x w > b and nondegenerate F (y) with finite support, the probability of match dissolution in the model with moral hazard is strictly between zero and one.
The proposition implies that even though matches are Jointly Productive, there exists some Y for any x w such that the match is not Incentive Compatible.
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Solution. In the solution to (8) that avoids the moral hazard problem, reservation output must satisfy:
while the expressions for g MH , φ MH , and k are the same as in (5) . Here, if x w > b it drives up the minimum output R MH required to sustain the match, changing the resulting values of g and φ. The MH wage
will exceed the Nash wage in expectation because the reservation productivity that solves the fixed point problem (9) is greater. Thus, the MH wage in a sustainable match compensates the worker for forgoing the moral hazard payment.
The impact of moral hazard. Given the model (8) , the worker will shirk if the value of not shirking and sustaining the match (the wage plus continuation value) is smaller than the payoff from shirking (the premium x w and outside option). A higher θ, the worker's bargaining power and consequent share of future match rents, reduces the incentive to shirk. A higher λ, the probability of re-matching, raises the value of the outside option and hence the incentive to shirk. A higher b, the contemporaneous outside option, with b < x w , increases the reservation threshold R MH but by less than it would increase R N . This is because match surplus, and therefore the wage and continuation value, continue to be determined by b, but R is now determined in part by x w as well, so b has a reduced effect.
To understand the magnitude of the efficiency loss in response to some of these parameters, we compare aggregate output in period t in the MH model,
The productivity loss resulting from shirking is
which is always non-negative since R N < R MH < 1. Summary. Matches in the Moral Hazard model are vulnerable to incentives that raise payoffs to the worker today but destroy the future value of the match. This generates inefficient outcomes by forcing the dissolution of matches that are Jointly Productive. Next in the Pension model, we demonstrate the circumstances under which a deferred payment conditioned on tenure will eliminate inefficient match destruction.
The Pension model
In the previous subsection, we assumed that the worker obtains the shirk premium x w in lieu of production when effort is low. This gives the worker the incentive to collect the short-run premium and re-enter the matching pool.
Here, we show that a deferred payment conditioned on match tenure -structured like a DB pension -can change the worker's incentives. The contract induces the worker to devote full effort and can be constructed to satisfy the same Joint Productivity condition as the Nash model above, yielding efficient matches. We demonstrate that the pension contract satisfies the Incentive Compatibility condition and avoids inefficiency associated with moral hazard; extension of the model to satisfy Joint Productivity is straightforward.
The pension contract. Suppose that the firm and worker write a contract {w, W, T } with the following elements:
• The worker collects wage w = w in each period when he is working and t < T .
• The worker collects W (T ), a lump sum, if he is still employed at time T .
We will discuss the choice of W and T later. Without loss of generality, we will set w = 0 for the rest of this discussion.
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Enforcement. We assume that the firm is prevented from breaking up the match if y t > R N and t < T . We also assume that the match breaks up if y t < R N , even if t < T . Thus, the firm pays out W at time T as long as y t > R N each period. 26 The assumption that firms are prohibited from severing productive matches but allowed to sever unproductive matches rests on the observability of y t and R N . It is crucial, however; if a firm could not break up a match once a contract is in place, the worker would have no incentive not to shirk. Therefore, we must appeal to reputation effects or to age discrimination laws which make it more difficult to fire older workers systematically than to lay off workers when output suffers. Empirical evidence indicates that obvious breach of deferred compensation contracts by employers is infrequent.
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The worker's incentives. Under the pension contract, the worker's continuation value g w P depend on the wage contract {w, W, T }. Again assuming w = 0, then at the outset
We need to demonstrate several things about the worker's incentives in order to prove that the pension contract is feasible. First, if the worker accepts the contract in period 1, she will not sever the match later.
The continuation value grows in later periods since the value is fixed but the worker discounts it less. Thus, by induction, she will not sever the match in any period t > 1 unless the productivity distribution shifts (which we have not allowed for yet) such that the worker's outside option grows relatively more valuable.
Next, we summarize in the following proposition the worker's incentive to shirk after accepting the contract, along with the worker's incentive to accept the contract at the outset :
Proposition 4 Suppose the worker's payoff to shirking is x w . Then, the worker will accept the contract {w, W, T } as long as the shirk premium satisfies x w < g w P + w − φ w . Specifically for the case w = 0, if x w < g w P − φ w in each period, then the worker will choose high effort.
Thus, the worker accepts the contract and does not shirk if the shirk premium is smaller than the value of the contract less the value of the outside option. We can check to see under what circumstances the contract in which the worker is paid w = 0 until time T and W at time T satisfies the inequality. Substituting (11) for g w and substituting for the value of φ w N we solved for above, this requires
for all t = 1, 2, ..., T . As we mentioned above, the constraint is more to likely bind the lower is t. As time passes, the worker gets closer to the pension payoff and is less likely to shirk and risk getting fired.
Note that condition (12) determines the minimum W necessary to provide the worker with the proper incentives, satisfying both Incentive Compatibility and Joint Productivity. The actual choice of W could be modeled as depending on θ, the bargaining weight that determines the split of current-period surplus. A possible choice of W is the one equal in present value to Nash bargaining each period, so
the expected future discounted value of the match less each period's wage payment, where R N is the severance risk, y t+i|t = E [y t+i |Ω t ], and Ω t is the information available when the contact is written.
In order to understand how condition ( reducing the likelihood that a productive match is formed; this raises the sustainable shirk premium for a given W . However, higher R N also raises the severance risk, so that staying matched becomes more uncertain; this reduces the sustainable shirk premium. At low R N , the effect on J dominates the effect on severance risk, making the required pension payoff W for a given termination date T relatively insensitive to changes in R N . As R N increases, the severance risk takes over and small changes in the reservation threshold have increasing effect on the sustainability of the pension contract. It is apparent from Figure 5 that the promise of the future pension that offers the worker a share of all future expected output has a powerful effect in deterring moral hazard. Thus, raising the shirk premium from 0.5 to almost 1 has little effect on the minimum required W for a given T . Figure 5 also shows the tradeoff between the term of the pension and its payoff; as noted above, an earlier termination date T allows for a lower payment W , given x w . If x w is 0.7, for example, a termination date of 25 periods requires a pension worth at least 27% of total expected Nash ouput, while a termination date of 15 periods requires a pension worth 10% of total output.
However, at sufficiently high values of x w (approaching or exceeding 1, the maximum value of per-period output) the pension contract is no longer viable. The only way to deter shirking is to continue to increase W as x w rises, but this is only profitable for the firm if it also extends T . Extending T raises the risk that the match will be severed before T , though. At some point, which is governed by (12), the firm cannot offer a high enough W to get the worker to accept the necessary increase in T , even if the worker's discount rate β gets very close to
1.
Summary. The contract {w, W, T } will be accepted by both agents and enhances efficiency when x w satisfies (12) . In the next subsection, we discuss how changes in the productivity process affect the pension contract.
Expected Tenure and the Productivity Process
The previous subsection demonstrated how the DB pension (the lump-sum payoff W at time T ) can resolve the inefficiencies resulting from moral hazard. In the model we laid out above, match productivity does not drift, so the continuation value remains constant. The pension contract will also be effective if match productivity drifts upward, boosting the continuation value over time.
In this section, we analyze the implications of other specifications of the productivity process -for example, downward drift that reduces the productivity of existing matches relative to new matches, or an increase in uncertainty. Later on, we discuss the corresponding technology shocks which we have in mind. These features reduce expected job tenure and, if severe enough, render the pension contract infeasible, as the worker no longer accepts deferral of payment because the risk of exogenous separation becomes too high.
For purposes of discussion, we define the following:
Definition 5 A worker's expected tenure is
Downward drift in the productivity of existing matches. Consider (7) in which matches are initially Jointly
Productive. Suppose now that output each period is drawn from successively less favorable probability distributions, so F t+1 (y) > F t (y) for all t. 28 This implies a time-dependent continuation value in which g t+1 (R) < g t (R).
The expression in (4) then implies an increasing reservation productivity R t+1 > R t , since conditional output J > 0 for all y; only a higher draw will make the agents willing to continue the match in the face of worsened long-term prospects. In the type of human capital model we have alluded to, these shocks result from the introduction of a new technology which erodes the value of existing skill-specific human capital.
The resulting condition R t+1 > R t has implications for job tenure. The severance risk Pr[Y t < R N ] = R R t 0 dF t (y) increases when either the distribution becomes less favorable or reservation output rises, increasing the likelihood of separation. This lowers expected job tenure and thus the expected value of the pension to the worker, since the probability that the match lasts until T declines. As we noted at the end of the previous subsection, this effect will reduce the maximum sustainable shirk premium, and at some point the contract breaks down. Put differently, as the likelihood of exogenous separation rises, the payoff date in the contract must get increasingly close to the initiation date for the worker to accept the risk of exogenous separation. However, reducing T also reduces the nominal value W of the pension which the employer is willing to offer. At some point expected tenure E(τ ) becomes small enough that the worker will not accept the contract. Consequently, a decline in expected tenure will lead to fewer and less valuable pension contracts.
Increased uncertainty in the productivity process. The productivity threshold R is invariant to a change in the variance of the productivity process. Hence, a mean-preserving spread in the productivity distribution raises the probability that the match will fall below the cutoff value R at some future date, if R lies below the mean of the productivity distribution. 29 Again, the terminal date T must be reduced for workers to accept the pension, but that reduces the nominal value W of the pension which undermines the value of the pension to workers.
Summary. The preceding discussion provides intuition as to the breakdown of DB pensions. Matches with stable or increasing continuation values can benefit from deferring payment to the worker in order to provide incentives that are unavailable in a standard Nash bargaining model. These contracts preserve jointly efficient matches that would ordinarily be severed. Matches with decreasing continuation values, however, might not sustain the pension contract, and shifts in the stochastic process that further reduce expected future productivity of existing matches make this increasingly likely. Additionally, a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of 28 The productivity distribution drifts stochastically in DRW. 29 The implications of a mean-preserving spread are reversed if R lies above the mean, but this case seems unlikely as it requires that the mean productivity draw is insufficiently high to warrant preserving matches. future productivity draws may sufficiently raise uncertainty about match duration that the pension contract can be sustained. 30 
Defined contribution pensions
Why do many jobs now feature largely portable DC pensions? The discussion above suggests a few possible motives. First, DC pensions may in part replicate the effects of DB pensions, either by encouraging longer tenure through short vesting periods and matching rates, or by screening workers who have other productive characteristics. These motives imply some substitutability between DB and DC pensions.
Another set of motives arises if individuals or the government value pensions as a means of saving. Behavioral models of saving demonstrate that individuals who have trouble saving may value pensions as a commitment device (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman 1998). 31 Alternately, the government may establish tax preferences for retirement saving because it believes people do not save enough. The government may think that people have trouble saving even if they do not, or that social insurance and welfare programs reduce saving through moral hazard. It is important to note that savings-related motives for DC plans do not offer an obvious explanation for the shift in pension structure and decline in job tenure.
Government Regulation in the Pension Model
In the moral hazard model, efficiency is enhanced by moving from the standard Nash contract to the DB pension contract if expected match tenure is sufficiently high. A decline in expected tenure, though, may destroy the viability of the pension contract. In this section we will evaluate the consequences if pension structure changes because of government regulation instead.
Suppose the government dislikes the outcome that some workers who take the pension contract suffer exogenous separation before they collect their pension and requires that workers be guaranteed their accrued pension wealth if matches end before T . This destroys the firm's ability to influence worker effort, and we can evaluate the loss resulting from rekindling the moral hazard problem. Again, suppose that output is drawn from a standard uniform distribution. Aggregate production in period t under the pension contract,Ỹ P , is the same as aggregate Nash production, which we defined earlier asỸ N = 1 − R N . Similarly, we defined aggregate production under moral hazard asỸ MH = 1−R MH . Therefore, the efficiency loss from government-imposed portability of pensions is identical to the efficiency loss Λ from moral hazard, defined earlier as Λ = 30 One must consider other possible contracts at this point. Ramey and Watson (1997) showed that contracts with severance payments or punishments can sustain matches in the efficient but incentive-incompatible region. However, such contracts are rarely observed, perhaps because they are not easily enforceable or yield socially inefficient litigation upon separation. 31 This a leading explanation for the findings that both 401(k) plans (Engen and Gale 
Trends in Pensions, Job Tenure, and Technology
In this section, we present empirical evidence that supports our hypotheses. It would be difficult to estimate our model directly, given the absence of linked employee-employer longitudinal data or even employee longitudinal data with details about the structure of compensation or productivity. The alternative is to test the model's implications as they relate to pension structure and job tenure. While this effort is also limited by the available data, there are several types of evidence from the SCF and the CPS that we bring to bear. 32 First, we show that job tenure is related to pension structure, as our model presumes. We find that workers with a DB pension and with more valuable DB pensions have longer tenure than workers with DC pensions or workers with no pensions. This relationship has persisted as DB pension use has declined, so the same workers are experiencing both trends.
Second, we show evidence that the value of long-term jobs has dropped, since both DB pensions and the estimated "return to tenure" appear to have declined in value. This supports our explanation for the decline in job tenure and DB pensions.
Third, we show that the decline in job tenure is related to trends in technological progress, which supports our explanation for the decline in the value of long-term jobs. In particular, greater declines in job tenure occurred in industries with higher rates of technological progress. If, instead, government regulation induced the shift in pension structure, there would be no reason to expect such a link.
Pension structure and job tenure
We show that workers with DB pensions have longer current and expected total job tenure than both workers without pensions (as in Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993) and also workers with DC pensions (in contrast to Steinmeier 1993, 1995) . We also find that workers with more valuable DB pensions have longer tenure, controlling for the level of earnings, with the value explaining much of the differential effect on tenure of having a DB pension. However, we do not estimate a structural model of compensation and mobility, so our approach does not distinguish whether DB pensions cause longer tenure. 33 Regressing job tenure on pension type. We ran several regressions, separately for men and women, using both the SCF and CPS. Coefficient estimates are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 34 ,35 Table 3 about here Male workers with a DB pension in the SCF have been in their jobs about 5 years longer than workers without a pension, depending on the specification, and female workers with a DB pension have been in their jobs about 4 years longer. Workers with both a DB and DC pension have been in their job about half a year longer than workers with only a DB pension, but the difference is generally not statistically significant. In comparison, workers with a DC pension have been in their job 2-3 years longer than workers without a pension, significantly shorter than workers with a DB pension. It is unclear whether one wants to control for job characteristics such as industry and occupation, since they may help explain both pension structure and job tenure. Nevertheless, including these controls in the second and fourth columns of Table 3 reduces the estimated effect of pensions on tenure by only a year or less.
It is important to point out that the relationship between pensions and job tenure remains strong when year effects are included, so it does not reflect a spurious correlation between two trending variables. Moreover, it persists if we interact pension type with year, in results that are not shown; the estimated response to DB pensions was strong throughout the sample period and remained significantly higher than the response to DC pensions, though it declined by about 1-2 years by 1998, compared to 1983.
Since the effect of DB pensions has been consistently strong, we can conclude that the same workers who are experiencing a decline in DB pension coverage are also spending less time in their jobs. Without ascribing a structural interpretation, we can understand the magnitude of the estimated effect by noting that the observed shift in pension structure between 1983 and 1998 is associated with a decline in job tenure of 0.9 years for males and 0.6 years for females, according to regressions (4) and (8); this is of the same order of magnitude as the observed decline. 33 As we noted earlier, we were unconvinced by previous attempts to estimate endogenous selection into jobs with DB pensions. Including the level of earnings on the right-hand side in our regressions is just one possible source of endogeneity. To be clear, our goal is to understand the relationship between tenure and the structure of compensation, controlling for the level. 34 It would be preferable to run regressions on the probability of job exit if we had such data, rather than on current tenure, which represents incomplete spells. The mean of complete and incomplete job spells will be the same if spell length is not duration dependent. If they are, then a linear regression on tenure can be viewed as a first-order Taylor expansion of more complicated specifications (Freeman 1980) . As an alternative, we also ran regressions using total expected job tenure as the left-hand side variable, as a way to capture information about the expected duration of the spell. 35 When using SCF data in this section, all coefficient estimates and standard errors are computed from regressions run on multiple implicates (Rubin 1987) . We ran all tenure regressions separately by gender because men and women exhibited different secular trends. We obtain similar results if we run regressions on the log of tenure (Even and Macpherson 1996) .
We also ran regressions, not shown here, with total expected job duration as the left-hand side variable. These regressions showed a similar, significant differential effect of pension type on tenure. Workers with a DB pension have total expected tenure that is 5.5-7.5 years longer than workers without a pension, while workers with a DC pension have total expected tenure that is 3.5-4.5 years longer.
Lastly, the effect of pension structure on tenure is almost the same in the April 1993 CPS as in the SCF. In Table 4 , when job characteristics are included in specifications (2a), (2b), (6a), and (6b), both male and female workers with a DB pension have been in their jobs about 4 years longer than workers without a pension. In comparison, workers with a DC pension have been in their job around 2 1/2 years longer than workers without a pension, again significantly shorter than workers with a DB pension.
36 Table 4 about here Regressing job tenure on DB pension value. We used data reported in the SCF to compute the value of DB pensions and added that information to regressions like those reported in Table 3 . Most individuals with DB pensions report the pension benefit which they expect to receive if they stay in their job as long as intended. In some regressions, we included this information directly. However, because it is endogenous with expected tenure and reported with error (Gustman and Steinmeier 1999) , in other regressions we included instead the average expected benefit, imputed on the basis of earnings, industry, occupation, education, unionization, employer size, and gender. This is similar to the approach in Steimeier (1993, 1995) , described in more detail below, of including a measure of pension backloading. 37 We find several interesting results, which are shown in Table 5 . 38 First, a higher value of one's DB pension at retirement is associated with significantly longer tenure. The results show that the semi-elasticity of tenure with respect to the monthly pension benefit (the statistic reported by most of the post-1983 sample) is 0.5-0.6 when self-reported information is included (in regressions labelled (a)) and 0.25-0.4 when the average benefit is included (in regressions labeled (b)). This implies, for a male with the median value of expected future pension benefits ($883 per month in 1998 dollars), that job tenure is 3.5 years longer than it is for someone without a DB pension, according to specification (4a), half a year longer than someone with the 25th percentile value ($351),
and almost a year shorter than someone with the 75th percentile value ($1867). For a female with the median 36 The numbering of the CPS regressions in Table 4 parallels the numbering of the SCF regressions in Table 3 . It is noteworthy that the estimated effect of pensions declines by only a couple tenths of a year when detailed industry and occupation codes, which are available in the CPS but not in the SCF, are included in specifications (2) and (5). 37 Our analysis differs in two primary ways. First, their left-hand side variable is the probability of job exit and their right-hand side variable is the value of backloaded compensation that is available if the employee does not exit. Second, we use pension data reported by individuals (or based on information collected from employers in 1983); because they lacked such data, Gustman and Steinmeier imputed the backloading variable from employer-provided information in the 1983 SCF. 38 Again, all coefficient estimates and standard errors are computed from regressions run on multiple implicates. The numbering of the regressions in Table 5 parallels the numbering of the regressions in Table 3. value ($541), job tenure is 3.8 years longer than it is for someone without a DB pension, according to specification (8a).
39 Table 5 about here Second, once we control for DB pension value, then the additional effect of having a DB pension is smaller than in Table 3 . It lies in a range between 0.5-3.5 years (versus 4-5 years in Table 3 ), in some cases not statistically distinguishable from zero and in others not statistically distinguishable from the effect of DC pensions, which remains in the range of 2-3 years. Together, these two findings support our hypothesis that DB pensions are used to extend job tenure, since the differential effect of DB pensions on tenure is operating through the value of the pension.
Third, the semi-elasticity of tenure with respect to earnings is somewhat larger (in the range of 1.5-2.5 years) than the semi-elasticity with respect to pension value. This contradicts anomalous results in Steinmeier (1993, 1995) . According to their estimates, a given increase in pension backloading had a much greater effect in deterring mobility than a given increase in current compensation. We will discuss their results in greater detail next.
Comparison to other results. The results in Tables 3-5 , duplicated in two data sets, differ importantly from Steinmeier (1993, 1995) , who found similar mobility rates for workers with DB and DC pensions, both in their raw data and in their econometric estimates. Their econometric analysis was related to ours, but they used different data and included proxies for variables which they had difficulty measuring. A key difference is their use of the SIPP. The SIPP is a panel, which allowed them to focus on mobility rather than tenure. 40 However, they only used data from 1984-85, before DC plans became common. Also, in their words, "the SIPP question sequence on plan type is atypical" (p.303, 1993) and overstated the prevalence of DC plans. The explanation for the differences in the results may therefore involve differences in the time period or in how job mobility and pension structure are measured.
Another distinction in their econometric approach was their inclusion of an imputed measure of the compensation available in alternative jobs, adjusted for sample selection, on the right-hand side of their mobility equation. 41 Their results suggest that pensioned workers faced worse alternatives relative to their current job than did non-pensioned workers and that the compensation differential had a greater effect than pension wealth in deterring mobility. This is an important finding, but it hinges on knowing the terms of alternative jobs available 39 When we use total expected tenure on the left-hand side, the estimated semi-elasticity with respect to the same variables are about twice as large. 40 The reliability of job mobility data in the SIPP is unclear, though, since it does not show the decline in job tenure which is apparent in other surveys, as we discussed earlier. 41 Other differences in the econometric approach are less consequential and are described in Friedberg and Owyang (2002b) .
to workers who do not move. No motivation was offered for the identifying exclusion restrictions used in imputing alternative compensation. 42 To sum up, Gustman and Steinmeier did not, in our view, present convincing evidence that the alternative compensation premium, rather than the structure of DB pensions, explain the pension-mobility relationship. We have reached this conclusion because of our evidence of a robust relationship between pension structure and reduced mobility, which contrasts with their evidence, and because of the difficulties of measuring alternative compensation.
The value of long-term jobs to workers
As we have emphasized, we do not have data to estimate changes in the value of a long-term job. While we have no way to measure the employer's share of the value of long-term jobs, we can examine indicators of changes in the worker's share. We show two ways in which tenure-related compensation appears to have shrunk: DB pensions appear to have lost value, and the degree to which earnings rise with tenure has fallen. After presenting the evidence, we discuss how these results can be interpreted in light of our model.
The value of DB pensions. The SCF does not provide ideal data to measure changes in the value of DB pensions. As described above, from 1989 on it reports the benefit people expect to receive when they leave the firm. In order to detect changes over time, we regress this variable on year dummies. However, the expected pension benefit depends on both the degree to which a DB pension defers compensation as well as the worker's expected tenure. In order to isolate the first component, we include detailed controls for current and expected remaining job tenure in the regressions. We also control for current earnings, in case overall compensation declined, and in some cases we control for other individual and job characteristics, to isolate shifts in the terms of particular jobs, rather than shifts in the composition of jobs. Table 6 about here
With the caveat that it may to some extent reflect changes in tenure, the regressions in Table 6 show that DB pensions declined significantly in value between 1989 and 1998. For the average male with a DB pension, according to the results in specification (2), the expected monthly benefit declined by $46 between 1989 and 1992, by $179 between 1992 and 1995, and by $69 between 1995 and 1998. The overall drop of $295 represented an 18% decline below the average monthly benefit in 1989 of $1648 (measured in 1998 dollars) and is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Among females, according to the results in (4), the trend tended to be negative but not monotonic, since the expected monthly benefit fell $322 in 1992, rose $256 in 1995, and then fell $191 in 1998. The overall decline of $258, or 26% below the 1989 value of $998, is statistically significant at the 95% level. These results suggest that deferred compensation is smaller than it used to be, especially since pension wealth in DC plans is largely independent of tenure (Gustman and Steinmeier 1995).
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The relationship between tenure and earnings. A common practice in the labor literature is to estimate a "return to tenure", with current earnings on the left-hand side and tenure, along with other measures of human capital, on the right. While our model does not feature a rising wage profile, we alluded earlier to extensions with rising wages as an element of an incentive contract that lengthens job duration. Farber (1999) described the problem of interpreting such estimates, since many theories (including ours) predict that compensation is structured to influence tenure. He argued that such estimates are interesting, nonetheless, in revealing the nature of firm-level compensation structures. This motivates our analysis as well.
We used data from CPSs between 1983 and 2000, since the CPS offers large sample sizes. 44 We estimated log earnings equations for men and women separately, and we included linear and higher-order terms (up to quartics) in tenure for each CPS year. Table 7 about here   Table 7 shows the earnings premium paid to the average male and female worker with 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of tenure, compared to a worker beginning a job. The results offer some, though not complete, support for our claim that the value of long-term jobs declined over the last twenty years. There was a sharp decline in the tenure premium, but it did not begin until the early 1990s for men and the middle 1990s for women. Before that, the tenure premium rose, though not significantly. For example, the earnings premium enjoyed by males with 10 years of tenure rose from 20.4% in 1983 to 24.7% in 1991 and then fell to 16.5% in 2000. The overall drop in the tenure premium between 1983 and 2000 was statistically significant, and it fell the most for males with 10-15 years of tenure. 45 For females, the drop-off occurred a little later but was sharper, so that the premium at each year of tenure shown in Table 7 was significantly lower in 2000 than in 1983. For example, for females with 10 years of tenure, 43 We also verified that the decline in the value of DB pensions, if it occurred for exogenous reasons, is not nearly large enough to explain the overall decline in job tenure, according to our estimates in Table 5 . 44 The wording of questions in earlier CPS tenure supplements was different. We adjusted the reported tenure data for half-year rounding among those with 1-2 years of tenure; while Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1996, 1997) estimated the probability of rounding up at between 56 and 65%, depending on the sample year, we simply assumed that half of individuals rounded up. We did not adjust the data for heaping at five-year intervals, as they did; in their 1996 paper, they showed that adjustments for rounding and heaping did not affect conclusions about the magnitude of trends in job tenure. When we tried adjusting the sampling weights, as they did, for differences in nonresponse to the tenure question by age, sex, and race, the results were virtually identical. 45 The F-statistic testing whether tenure was jointly significantly different in 2000 than in 1983 at all of the five-year age intervals shown in Table 7 had a p-value above 97%. As a point of reference, Topel (1991) estimated that the earnings premium for males with 10 years of tenure was over 25%. the earnings premium rose from 25.5% in 1983 to 28.5% in 1996 and then fell to 14.6% in 2000.
We also find that the tenure premium dropped in industries with declines in average tenure. We determined this by regressing the median real tenure premium on average job tenure, although we do not ascribe a causal interpretation to the results. We find that a one-year decline in average job tenure is associated with a significant 2.2 percentage point decline in the tenure premium (which has a median value of roughly 18%). 46 Interpretation. Our results show that both DB pensions and the earnings premium associated with longer tenure appear to have shrunk in value. Under what assumptions can we infer from this evidence that the value of long-term jobs has fallen? We control for the level of current earnings, so these changes are not a consequence of an overall reduction or redistribution of match surplus. In the context of our model, the evidence demonstrates that something related specifically to the duration of the job changed.
Our discussion of the pension contract illustrated the tradeoff between the term and the value of the DB pension -the worker demands a pension that pays off sooner if the likelihood of exogenous separation increases, but as that likelihood increases it reduces the size of the pension that the firm is willing to offer and at the limit threatens its viability. Thus, a decline in the value of remaining DB pensions supports our hypothesis that the value of long-term jobs fell. If, in contrast, increased regulation explained the shift away from DB pensions, it is not clear why it would also reduce the value of remaining DB pensions.
The literature offers a number of explanations for observing a tenure premium. In the context of those explanations, the inferences we can draw from a declining tenure premium are generally consistent with our main arguments. Obviously, if the tenure premium is a component of a tenure-based incentive contract, then a decline implies that the motivation to use long-term contracts has diminished. Another possible explanation is selective mobility, so that the observed wage rises with tenure because workers in better jobs stay in them longer.
Selective mobility is an outcome of our matching model -matches end selectively when their productivity draw falls below a reservation level -and it will result in a tenure premium when it is combined with Nash bargaining and upward drift in stochastic match productivity. A shift in the productivity process that undermines the value of existing matches relative to new matches would lead to more mobility and an ambiguous effect on the observed tenure premium; matches that persist may have even higher value, but new matches have higher values as well, so this could be consistent with our main argument. A final explanation for observing a tenure premium is that workers are paid their marginal product and match-specific productivity rises with tenure. A decline in the tenure premium in this framework would result from a decline in productivity of long-tenured workers. In sum, under various models of wage formation a decline in the tenure premium can be explained by a decline in the 46 We computed the average tenure premium and job tenure in 27 two-digit industries that were big enough to employ at least 100 people in each CPS survey. The regressions are weighted by the number of people from the CPS in each cell. If we control for year and industry effects (accounting for economy-wide changes and industry-specific values of the tenure premium), then the correlation is greater, with a one-year decline in average job tenure is associated with a 4.6 percentage point decline in the tenure premium. productivity of long-term matches.
Job tenure and technological progress
We have showed that both actual and expected job tenure fell, and that deferred compensation appears to have shrunk. From this, we infer that the value of long-term jobs has declined. In our model, this will occur if there is an acceleration of shocks that erode the productivity of existing matches relative to new matches, or even if there is simply an increase in uncertainty about the future productivity of matches. We hypothesize that a shift in the nature of new technologies, beginning 20-30 years ago, has had such effects. As above, we do not have data to test this directly, but we are able to demonstrate that the decline in job tenure in the CPS occurred in industries that experienced higher rates of technological change.
In the concluding section, we allude to a body of research finding that new technologies, and especially information-related technologies, have had the effects that we hypothesize. These earlier researchers used a variety of strategies to confront the same difficulties we face in determining the impact of new technologies. For example, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) regressed an industry-level average outcome on industry-level measures of technological change, as we do.
We are interested in relating changes in job tenure by industry and TFP growth by industry. The earliest consistent tenure information in the CPS is reported in January 1983 and the latest in February 2000, so we computed the change in average job tenure by industry from 1983 to 2000. We use TFP growth from the Jorgenson Total Factor Productivity Series, which covers 21 manufacturing sectors and 14 other non-manufacturing sectors from 1959 to through 1996. While it is an arbitrary choice, we used TFP growth over the ten-year period ending in 1996. 47 Thus, we regressed the change in average job tenure by industry over 1983-2000 on average TFP growth by industry, weighted by the quantity of labor by industry in 1996. 48 The coefficient estimate on the ten-year average of TFP growth is -32.4 (14.6), which is significant at the 95% confidence level. A one-standard deviation change in average TFP growth was 0.0111 across industries in 1996 (the range was -0.0148 to 0.0416). The estimates thus suggest that an industry with TFP growth that exceeded the average by one standard deviation experienced a decrease in average job tenure of 0.36 years; recall that average job tenure declined 0.92 years between 1983 and 1998. These correlations support our view that the decline in job tenure is linked to technological change. 47 We obtained very similar estimates using TFP growth over the five-year period ending in 1996. Information about the data is available in Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and at : http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/data/35klem.html. 48 The quantity of labor input is computed as the value of labor inputs divided by the price of labor inputs.
Conclusion
In this paper we have specified a model of DB pensions and job tenure. DB pensions eliminate inefficient job destruction resulting from moral hazard. In related papers, DB pensions or other forms of deferred compensation encourage investment in job-specific capital or discourage on-the-job search. The use of DB pensions is undermined, however, if expected job tenure declines. We have shown in this paper that both actual and expected job tenure fell along with the use of DB pensions.
We also used the model to demonstrate the types of changes in the stochastic productivity process which will reduce expected job tenure and hence the use of DB pensions. In particular, we focused on shocks that increase uncertainty about future match productivity, perhaps by affecting the value of existing job-specific capital. Lastly, we showed that industries which experienced more rapid growth in technological progress experienced greater declines in job tenure.
The occurrence of shocks of the type we have in mind is suggested by a large body of research on the shifting nature and pace of technological change. Researchers have found that the diffusion of new, especially informationrelated, technologies has had a powerful effect on the level of compensation by increasing earnings inequality (Gottschalk 1997 , Acemoglu 2002 ). Other research shows rising inequality in pension and health insurance coverage as well. Our hypothesis is that it has altered the structure as well as the level of compensation by reducing the value of long-term jobs.
The key reason for rising inequality is that new technologies are largely skill and ability-biased. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) showed that the average skill level of workers rose more in industries that experienced higher rates of investment in general and of computerization in particular. Case study evidence suggests further that what makes new technologies ability-biased is that they require new, and in some cases more complex, skills.
Computer use is, obviously, one of the new skill requirements. Both employers and individuals continue to devote substantial resources to computer training, even while computers have grown easier to use over time. Our evidence adds to this literature by suggesting that jobs have been reorganized in ways that loosen the ties of long-term relationships between workers and firms. Moreover, since both expected remaining job tenure and the use of DB pensions in new jobs has declined, our results indicate that the change in the productivity process has been permanent. Details: Statistics were weighted using survey weights. Approximately 14% of respondents answered that they would "never stop"; we took the following steps to impute a specific answer for them: (1) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from all work; or else (2) we used their answer if they responded to a later question about when they would retire from full-time work; or else (3) we assumed that they would work until the age of eighty. In 1995-98, "less than a year" was coded as a separate answer, in which case we assigned a value of zero; in 1983-92 one is the smallest coded response, and for respondents who were coded with a value of one, we randomly assigned an answer of zero in the same proportion as is observed among those answering zero or one in 1995-98 (which will lead to a slight underestimate of the decline in tenure). In addition to the year effects and interactions shown in the table, the independent variables include age and age squared; employer size; main effects for education (4 categories), occupation (6 categories), industry (6 categories) and union coverage; interactions of education and occupation and of industry and occupation; gender and interactions of gender with education, occupation, and industry. Statistics were weighted using survey weights. The surveys from 1989 and later include five sets of multiply imputed variables (called implicates). While other estimates involving variance in this paper correct for the presence of multiple imputations using the methods introduced in Rubin (1987) , the estimates in this table do not; rather, the estimates treat each implicate as independent data. However, ANOVA estimates done on each implicate separately did not deviate by more than two percentage points in either direction from those reported here. Sample: Full-time employees, excluding those who report tenure in excess of potential experience plus two (about 1.5% of the sample); those whose pension type is unknown (approximately 0.5% of the remaining sample); and those with earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution. Details: The coefficient estimates and Huber-White standard errors are computed from regressions run on multiple implicates, as in Rubin (1987) . The regressions were weighted using survey weights. * indicates a confidence level of at least 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%. Specifications: (1) and (5) includes real weekly earnings (in 1998 dollars), age and age squared. (2) and (6) add job variables (4 education, 6 industry, 6 occupation, and 6 firm size dummies, industry* occupation, education*occupation, union coverage). (3) and (7) add year dummies. (4) and (8) add variables from (2) and (3) along with year*industry, year*occupation, year*education, year*union coverage. Table 4 , with the addition of variables representing DB pension benefits expected at retirement The value was reported in one of three different ways: (1) over 95% of individuals with a DB pension in 1989-98 reported a periodic amount that they expect to receive when they leave their job; (2) about 2.5% of individuals with a DB pension in 1989-98 reported a lump-sum amount which they expect to receive; (3) the SCF reported expected pension wealth for 55% of individuals with a DB pension in 1983, based on information collected from employers. We included the natural log of the present value of each of these variables, along with dummy variables indicating which of the three variables (if any) was reported for a given observation. In regressions (1a), (4a), (5a), and (8a), the self-reported variable is included. In regressions (1b), (4b), (5b), and (8b), the average value is included, imputed on the basis of log earnings, industry, occupation, education, unionization, and employer size, separately for men and women. The numbering of the regressions parallels the numbering in Table 4 . Huber-White standard errors appear in parentheses;
* indicates a confidence level of at least 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%. For additional information, see notes to Table 4 . 
